The Risen People

The Wexford Republic

by Ruth Coppinger

"I understand... you are rather inclined to hold the insurrection cheaply. Rely upon it, there never was in any country so formidable an effort on the part of the people." (Lord Castlereagh to the Chief Secretary). 1

Wexford lay at the heart of 1798. Indeed, it was the only county where the rebellion was so successfully, popularly and enduringly fought. For over a month, a rebel Wexford army made up of approximately 30,000 ordinary people engaged trained Crown forces and won control of most of the county. For three weeks, a civilian government ran Wexford as a republic, electing four Catholics and four Protestants as their leaders.

Yet, the Wexford rebellion has been variously interpreted as a rising of Catholics against oppression; an agrarian peasant war; or a sectarian campaign of bloodlust by an unruly mob.

A Catholic Rising?

The first of these interpretations is the most ironic. The spin-doctoring which aimed at boosting the church's role in 1798 only began at the safe distance of the next century when the church sought to consolidate its hold over the people in campaigns for Catholic emancipation, home rule and land reform. In 1870, Wexford's Fr. Patrick Kavanagh wrote a book which downplayed the politicization and planning of the rebellion and characterized it as a solely Catholic struggle for "Faith and Fatherland" in which the church had stood by the people. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Not only the United Irishmen, but every other group which fought oppression in the 19th century such as Whiteboys, Rightboys and Defenders, were publicly condemned by the Catholic hierarchy. Rank-and-file priests who fought alongside the 1798 rebels, such as Wexford's Fr. Murphy, were denounced as "the feces of the church". At all stages the bishops colluded with the authorities, having most to fear from cross-religious, radical political organization and the dangerous influence of egalitarian ideas from the French Revolution. Wexford's Bishop Caulfield pompously declared that "it was a happy epoch indeed when the people, the puppies, the rabble dictate."

Similarly inaccurate is the view of Pakenham, whose 1969 book, The Year of Liberty, dismissed Wexford as "the old agrarian war under a new name" and the actions of "a half-disciplined mob with little idea beyond plunder". Some closeted academics find it difficult to see how economic deprivation has anything to do with political action. In any case, Wexford was one of the most fertile and prosperous of counties. If land issues alone accounted for the rebellion, why then did the most class-riven areas with a long record of rural secret societies, such as Tipperary, or the poorest western counties play little or no role in the 1798 rebellion?

A Sectarian Rising?

It is the charge of sectarianism which most demands an answer, given Ireland's history of the last 200 years. Part of the concentration on sectarianism comes from the propaganda war immediately after the rebellion. It suited the government to portray the rebellion as yet another "Popish plot" in order to detach Presbyterians from their anti-establishment stance. Apologists from the United Irishmen were also anxious to avoid blame for organizing armed insurrection. The Presbyterian radical James Hope commented on these distortions:

"It is hard for a man who did not live at the time to believe or comprehend the extent to which misrepresentations were carried at the close of our struggle; for, besides paid agents, the men who flinched and fell away from our cause, grasped at any apology for their own delinquency.

While it would be wrong to airbrush sectarianism from 1798, it is important to also understand that the structure of the 18th century state was such that any action against it would inevitably be characterized as sectarian.

Politically and socially, Wexford had the same three tiers as the country in general: Anglicans, Dissenters (Presbyterians) and Catholics as first, second and third-class citizens respectively. There was no monolithic "Protestant" and "Catholic" grouping - both were split between conservative and liberal. Encouraged by the French Revolution where "Catholics" had shown such political maturity, Protestant liberals in Wexford such as Bagenal-Harvey, William Hatton, Samuel Cooper, Anthony Perry, Matthew Keugh, George Sparks and many others joined the United Irishmen founded in Dublin in 1791. On the Catholic side, younger radicals, recently returned from France, such as Edward Hay, James Edward Devereux and Edward Sweetman were outflanking the old Catholic leadership in the country and seeking to isolate the clergy. Bishop Caulfield bemoaned their political activity:

The spirit of [Wexford] town is now violent beyond belief and a general sullenness pervades. It seems to be the plan adopted to give the clergy nothing if they do not come into their measures. 2

Politicization

This younger, more assertive generation had been raised after the American and French Revolutions and gravitated towards the United Irishmen. However, more widespread politicization had been taken place throughout the 1790s, so that Sweetman could boast to Wolfe Tone that in Wexford "the lower orders are all alive and would do anything." In 1795, 20,000 signed a petition for a Catholic Relief Act and enthusiastically participated in the Catholic Convention elections; in 1795, 22,251 petitioned for the reinstatement of Fitzwilliam as Lord Lieutenant. 3

More significantly, the proselytizing carried out by United Irish activists was successfully establishing branches throughout the county. The extent and popular appeal of the organization is seen by the professions of one cell in Clonegal - mason, blacksmith, slater, laborer, farmer, tailor, carpenter, carman and a malster, pulican and schoolteacher. Wider links were established with the outer baronies, with Dublin and with Wicklow. Big farmers were also becoming active in the leadership.

While worried by the rapid spread of the United Irishmen, no consensus about how to respond emerged initially amongst the authorities. One tactic adopted in Wexford was to use the churches to extract a series of loyalty oaths from Catholics. Dublin Castle was more critical of the lax law and order policies in Wexford and elsewhere and appointed new hardline magistrates, as well as overseeing the transplantation of the Orange Order into the area.

While Wexford escaped much of the terror experienced in other counties - floggings, arrests and house burnings were being regularly carried out in Wicklow - the decision to base the 600-strong North Cork militia in the county in April 1798 created huge tension. Explicitly Protestant, publicly wearing Orange insignia and led by Lord Kingsborough whose family had a record of sectarianism, their ferocious reputation seemed vindicated by the introduction of the pitch-cap. Intended to stiffen loyalist backbone and strike fear into potential insurgents, the arrival of the North Corks also played into United Irish hands, whose leaders could now argue with moderate and more clerical opponents that only the United Irishmen could legitimately defend Catholics against this new visible threat. A further boost to the imminent rising in Wexford was an accidental one: the Wexford United Irish membership figures had arrived late for the famous meeting at Oliver Bond's house in Dublin and so never reached government hands when the house was raided in March.

Preparations

By April there was a widespread acceptance of the need for rebellion, as seen by this extract from a touching letter by Walter Devereux of Ballybrittas to his brother in America:

"It is the greatest happiness to you that you left this unfortunate country... I would send you a more full account only I hope it will not be long until it will be known and praised throughout the world. Dear John, send no remittance to Ireland until you learn of her freedom and then, when you do, your honest friends shall only receive the benefit. If the times are not settled before August, I certainly will then leave this land of tyranny and seek a land of liberty. But for a man here to promise himself a single day to live would be presumption..." 4

These facts contradict the portrayal of the rebellion as spontaneous and unplanned. In fact, a well-laid out plan for rebellion had been drawn up amongst United Irishmen. For some years, a debate had raged within the group over the course revolution should take. Moderates argued there should be no rising without French aid. Radicals favored insurrection with or without French support. This latter view came to be more popularly accepted and by 1796 a military strategy was adopted more in line with indigenous rebellion.

Plans Thwarted

To deliver a successful coup, Dublin was critical as the capital and military, administrative and economic nerve center of the country. The plan was threefold: firstly, to seize key buildings in Dublin, engage the military in fighting and, presumably, enlist the support of ordinary Dubliners; secondly, to mobilize the "crescent counties" (the counties of Dublin, Meath, Kildare and Wicklow) and prevent reinforcements reaching the capital; and thirdly, for the outer tier of counties, including Wexford, to rise the following day and block reinforcements from any of the big military camps elsewhere. The date for rebellion was set for May 23rd, to be known only by a few leaders.

This ambitious plan was to be thwarted, however. Government awareness led to early arrests of key leaders and a nationwide enforcement of the handing in of all arms. There was thus to be no decisive strike in Dublin city, scuppering the key element of the plan, although the inner crescent areas from Dalkey to Tallaght and Lucan to Clontarf, did not turn out. While the other crescent and first-tier counties rose and took control of some towns, confusion led to quick defeats. By the end of May 24th, the rebellion had failed to spread beyond Wicklow, Kildare and southern parts of Meath.

Confusion also reigned in Wexford. Amazingly, several very prominent United Irishmen continued to be involved in disarmament with Edward Fitzgerald, Edward Hay and Bagenal Harvey even supervising the process! Meanwhile, in Gorey, their comrade, Perry, was being tortured by authorities.

Some units were well prepared, however, and did mobilize. On Saturday May 26th, for example, Kilcormick men gathered under the guise of a turf-cutting meitheal. As news filtered that the midlands had risen and of government atrocities against prisoners and Catholic yeomen soldiers in Wicklow and Carlow, 2,000 people gathered, as planned, at parish level in groups of 30 or so by the morning of May 27th.

The government response was slow and confused. Having jailed most of Wexford's best-known United Irishmen, the authorities were oblivious to a newly emerging situation whereby the jailed moderate leaders were being replaced of necessity by an effective local leadership. As local bands of people began to search for the arms they had been forced to hand in only days before, the authorities eventually reacted, burning empty houses which they assumed were those of rebels and even shooting stragglers they met along roadsides. Loyalist families took flight, throwing armfuls of belongings onto carts and driving out on any open route. Most were unharmed as they fled.

The first open confrontation took place on Kilthomas Hill and was a disaster for the rebels. Heavily armed infantry fired at the rebels, which, as Daniel Gahan points out in his brilliantly detailed book, The People's Rising, was "the first volley almost every man on the hilltop would have heard and the sound must have been terrifying to many of them". 5 They broke ranks and fled for their lives down the slope and into the countryside where they were chased and over 100 killed. The cavalry devastated the surrounding countryside for much of the rest of the morning and killed anyone they found.

The easy victory of the government forces confirmed in loyalist minds what they had assumed for years - that insurgents would utterly collapse when faced by trained soldiers. This innate feeling of superiority on the government side and the passionate conviction on the rebel side that Dublin must have risen turned the advantage towards the latter.

Oulart

The most decisive battle of the rebellion was at Oulart later that day and was a completely different outcome for the rebels, who made up for their inferior weaponry of pikes, pitchforks and a few stolen rifles by drawing in the loyalist army and forcing them into close combat. Oulart debunked the notion that trained soldiers could always defeat rebel fighters. With the rifles taken from the defeated soldiers and with rebel numbers swelling from surrounding areas, the insurgents now had the initiative and Oulart was to inspire further impressive victories.

The ingenuity and talent of ordinary people must be marveled at when studying the Wexford rebellion. Among the initiatives taken was a raid on the house of the Bishop of Ferns whose curtains were taken for tents and leather book covers for saddles! Other houses of the wealthy or of officials - mostly now abandoned - were similarly raided. While some of today's commentators remain unimpressed, opponents were often to complement their fighting skills.

The Wexford rebels were, of course, mostly untrained. Village/neighbor networks and commitment to a cause bound members together. As Kevin Whelan elaborates, bonds grew out of hurling teams, mayboy groups, turf-cutting and hay gathering meitheals and other groups of young adult males. Corps marched chanting the names of their native townland. These pre-existing linkages were vital in keeping together non-professional soldiers through an arduous and very mobile campaign. So was commitment to a cause whose strength even adversaries had to concede. The Revd. Thomas Handcock spoke of hanging victims who "almost all died with a firmness and serenity worthy of a more worthy cause."

Miles Byrne, an 18-year-old who fought in all the key Wexford battles and would afterwards serve for 35 years as an officer in the French army, admired the "clever military manner" of the Pollahoney troop led by Matthew Doyle "all keeping their ranks as if they had been trained soldiers and strictly executing his commands." A loyalist soldier remarked that he "never saw any troops attack with more enthusiasm and bravery than the rebels did."

Enniscorthy was the next rebel target. After a fierce two-hour battle, the main garrison opted to abandon the town, leaving the rebels command of the central section of the county. In addition, hundreds of men and women from the town joined their ranks, injecting an important urban component and an irresistible momentum. It goes without saying that the costs were high, with hundreds of casualties on both sides in the first opening days of this bloody conflict. Many corpses were also reported to be badly mangled.

A base camp had been established at Vinegar Hill, chosen for its important vantage point of the county. This was now swelling daily and discussions about strategy were ongoing. There was a case for no further offensives - the Wexford rebels had already gone way beyond their planned brief which had been to stop reinforcements reaching the capital. With their leaders arrested, they opted to go on with Wexford town as the next obvious target.

Rebel Administration

The rebels took the town easily on May 30th, the main garrison having decided to flee, leaving most of the loyalist refugees behind them. However, as Gahan comments, the massive destruction of life and property that the loyalists feared did not occur:

Bands of insurgents attacked buildings that symbolized the old regime and its main supporters... but most simply milled about the streets. Some ran up green and white flags on a number of prominent buildings as a formal declaration that the town had been liberated. The sailors in the ships anchored in the harbor promptly answered the signal by running up their own white flags, thereby demonstrating their common cause with he rebels and revealing how well organized the entire movement was.

Having captured the vital towns in the county, the rebels considered their next moves. Unbeknownst to them, the rebel cause nationally was in terrible trouble with only partial success in the rest of Leinster, defeat in Dublin and nothing as yet in Ulster. The insurgents thus focused on consolidating their hold on the county, believing all their arrangements would be temporary until the official declaration of a republic by a provisional government in Dublin.

First concern was governing Wexford town itself which, as one of Ireland's chief settlement centers and ports, needed to be provisioned now that normal channels of trade had been disrupted. A burning priority also was preventing a complete breakdown of law and order, a real possibility in the revolutionary climate which prevailed. An eight-man Directory of four Catholics and four Protestants was the chief administrative body. A second tier of mainly Catholic town merchants was also elected. Most politically advanced was the establishment of a Senate of 500 citizens, made up of representatives from parishes across the county.

The former mayor was also included. A small press in the town was seized to print proclamations and other documents, including ration vouchers for food and duel. Food supplies were maintained by requisitioning in the countryside and by intercepting ships passing Wexford harbor with grain. Security at the harbor was organized. Divisions were sent out to New Ross and other parts of the county to consolidate the new regime.

The view of the rebels as a "half-disciplined mob" ignores this sense of order. In one page of Pakenham's book alone, he patronizingly refers to a "leaderless army cheerfully searching for whiskey" or a "mob of country people" with their actions. 6 But the United Irish leadership made strenuous efforts to avoid descent into chaos. One example is a "test oath" issued on June 14th by the "Council for Directing the Affairs of the People of the County of Wexford". It included a commitment to "persevere in endeavoring to form a brotherhood of affection among Irishmen of every religious persuasion"; to "obtain an equal, full and adequate representation of all the people in Ireland"; to have "an aversion to plunder and the spilling of innocent blood" and to "avoid drunkenness". [Italics are those words highlighted in the original test oath.]

Breakdown of Discipline

Prisoners and loyalist families naturally feared for their safety. Indiscriminate murders by hotheads and fanatics had taken place in the town on first arrival. These were stopped by Keugh who organized volunteer companies to acquire arms for the purpose of discouraging mob action.

However, discipline broke down at various stages of the rebellion. Two atrocities stand out most in tarnishing the rebels - Scullabogue and Wexford Bridge. At Scullabogue, over 100 loyalists were being held captive in a barn. On June 5th, as the rebels were attacking New Ross, a messenger reached Scullabogue with stories of the burning of a rebel hospital and the deaths in battle of at least 7,000 rebels.

The messenger claimed an order had been given to kill loyalist prisoners in retaliation. Three times the rebel captain in charge refused. Eventually, groups of prisoners were hauled out and shot in groups of fours. A second group set fire to the barn's thatched roof, burning alive all those inside, including about twenty wives and children of the North Cork militia. At Wexford Bridge on June 20th, 97 prisoners were murdered.

These horrific massacres were two occasions when discipline broke down. However, it is also important to note that they were not policy decisions of the United Irish leadership, who bitterly regretted them. On June 7th, for example, Edward Roche declared:

In the moment of triumph, my countrymen, let not your victories be tarnished by any wanton acts of cruelty: many of those unfortunate men in prison were not your enemies from principle, most of them, compelled by necessity, were obliged to oppose you. Neither let a difference in religious sentiments cause a difference among the people. 7

There is no way of accurately estimating the number of casualties in the rebellion. Bodies were mutilated, dumped in mass graves or the sea. Of the 20-70,000 estimated deaths, a minority were inflicted by the rebels. Miles Byrne constantly complained that the United Irishmen were too gentlemanly in their warfare, too willing to rely on negotiations and government "good faith" and too squeamish in their conduct.

Protestant Leaders

Within the Wexford United Irishmen leadership, a large proportion were Protestants and, if anything, there is every indication that the rank-and-file members deferred to them, rather than resented them. Anxious to avoid pogroms, a distinction was made between loyalists (politically active Protestants who had joined the yeomanry, Orange Order or army) and neutrals like the Quakers and liberal Protestants such as the Richards brothers and Ebenezer Jacob, who played leading roles in the Wexford republic.

Women and children were respected as non-combatants, the only dereliction being Sullabogue. Similar atrocities were authorized by the government side, of course, including the killing of fleeing rebels, stragglers on roadsides and the multiple rapes by the Dumbartonshire regiment of camp followers on Vinegar Hill.

The Wexford republic lasted for three weeks. Isolation, defeats and the failure of a French expedition to land and five a lifeline to the rebels meant the experiment would be short-lived. The failure of the rebellion was certainly no reflection on the people of Wexford.

Had other important centers - especially Dublin and the North - risen as successfully as Wexford had, the course of history could have been completely different. On June 21st General Lake bombarded rebels with cannon at the famous battle of Vinegar Hill, paving the way for the final defeat of the Wexford republic. A 45-mily march out of Wexford town into the surrounding hills and countryside was conducted under Fr. John Murphy and Miles Byrne and the town recaptured by crown forces the following day.

Most of the rebels would eventually be captured, including Fr. Murphy who was executed on July 2nd. As one of several Wexford priests who had shown bravery and leadership during the rebellion, his place in popular folk memory is well-deserved, even if exaggerated and exploited by Catholic nationalists. Byrne was to fare luckier, enjoying a long life in exile. In his Memoirs, he placed the rising firmly in a political context, restating the republican ideals of the United Irishmen and their hopes that French aid would free the country and lead to widespread social change:

"The church property becoming immediately the property of the state; and the estates of all those who should emigrate, or remain in the English army fighting against their country, being confiscated, the revenue arising from these funds would have been employed to provide for and defray all the expenses necessary for the defense and independence of the country."

The attempt to claim 1798 for one political or religious tradition should be ended in this bicentenary commemoration. The shared political project of the United Irishmen should be studied and discussed, now more than ever. The defeat of the 1798 rebellion marked a sad end to a century which had shown the potential to unite people of all religions in a republic in the true, original sense of the word. As this millennium closes, we could do worse than take note of a United Irish declaration and their attempt to create a new, non-sectarian society:

We have thought much about our posterity, little about our ancestors. Are we forever to walk like beasts of prey over the fields which these ancestors stained with blood?


Footnotes

  1. Kevin Whelan, "Reinterpreting the 1798 Rebellion in County Waterford", in D. Keogh & N. Furlong, (Eds.), The Mighty Wave: The 1798 Rebellion in Wexford (Dublin, 1996) p. 25.
  2. Ibid, p. 13.
  3. Ibid, p. 15.
  4. Ibid, p. 22.
  5. Daniel Gahan, The People's Rising: Wexford 1798, (Dublin, 1995).
  6. Thomas Pakenham, The Year of Liberty: The Story of the Great Irish Rebellion of 1798, (London, 1969).
  7. Whelan, p. 28.